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1 Introduction
Social norms provide informal rules that govern our actions within different
groups and societies and across all manner of situations. Many social norms
develop in order to overcome market failure, mitigate negative externalities
or promote positive ones so as to facilitate some collective goal (Arrow 1970;
Hechter and Opp 2001). However, social norms that are inefficient from a wel-
fare perspective also persist in the real world. Many historical norms, such as
the custom of dueling in the American South (Lessig 1995) and a millennium
of female foot-binding in China (Mackie 1996), have proven extremely resilient
to change. In modern times, bad social norms play an important role in many
topical policy issues, such as in environmental policy (Kinzig et al 2013; Zep-
pini 2015), human rights reform (Prentice 2012) and female genital mutilation
(Platteau et al 2017), and in many development economics issues, such as in-
come inequality (Singh and Dhumale 2000), population growth (Munshi and
Myaux 2006), and HIV/AIDS (Young et al 2010).
A key feature of a social norm is the desire to conform to the majority in a
group. We follow Bicchieri (2017, p.35), who defines a social norm as a “rule of
behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on condition that they
believe that (a) most people in their relevant network conform to it (empirical
expectation), and (b) most people in their relevant network believe they ought
to conform to it (normative expectation) and may sanction deviations.”
In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which bad norms emerge
and thrive. We conjecture that bad norms initially emerge as good norms, but
changing conditions over time alter the payoff structure such that the norm
not only ceases to solve negative externalities, but actually begins to promote
them. The most important contribution of our paper is that we investigate
the extent to which a lack of information about others’ preferences or atti-
tudes is important for the development of bad social norms. In particular, we
provide evidence that compares two predominant but opposing views on how
information about others’ preferences shapes bad norms.
One perspective is that bad norms can thrive independent of whether or
not people are informed of the preferences of others. This view is supported
by the model of Brock and Durlauf (2001), whose approach we use to study
the development of norms.1 They propose a stationary coordination game in
which agents are driven by a taste for conformity. All other things equal,
agents benefit when more people make the same choice as they do. In equi-
librium, players either coordinate on the welfare-maximizing allocation or on
a welfare-inefficient allocation. We extend their approach by allowing players
to be uncertain about the preferences of others, and by allowing preferences
to change over time. We introduce a simple belief formation procedure that
assumes that agents base their beliefs on the norm in the previous round and
1 Recent alternative approaches to modeling social norms include Michaeli and Spiro
(2017), who focus on pairwise interactions in a coordination game, Acemoglu and Jack-
son (2015), who investigate an intergenerational context, and Platteau et al (2017), who
investigate various norm approaches to the application of female genital mutilation.
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on their preference, which is known to correlate with the preferences of others.
This procedure allows us to generate predictions about when a society will
continue to play according to an equilibrium after it has turned from a good
to a bad one.2 Essentially, these predictions do not depend on the information
that players have about others’ preferences.
The alternative view is that bad norms are driven by pluralistic ignorance.
Pluralistic ignorance refers to a situation in which most individuals have pri-
vate attitudes and judgments that differ from the prevailing norm, and wrongly
believe that the majority of group members have a private preference to keep
to the status quo (Miller and McFarland 1987; Prentice and Miller 1996). As
a result, a bad norm may persist even though the majority of the group would
like to change it. Pluralistic ignorance has been linked to the propagation of
various damaging social issues, such as college binge-drinking (?), tax avoid-
ance (Wenzel 2005), school bullying (Sandstrom et al 2013) and the spread
of HIV/AIDS due to stigmas against condom usage (Gage 1998). Notice that
in this approach, the uncertainty about other individuals’ preferences is a key
ingredient for the emergence and persistence of bad social norms.
We use the model of Brock and Durlauf (2001) to design an experiment
that allows us to investigate the role that information about others’ preferences
plays for the development of bad norms, thus incorporating the insights from
the pluralistic ignorance viewpoint. In our experiment, we monetarize social
payoffs as a convenient way to test the model’s predictions.3 In a setup with
2 By way of a practical example, consider handshaking, which US President Donald
Trump has called “one of the curses of American society”. Shaking hands as a form of
greeting is believed to have originated around 2,000 years ago between opposing mili-
tary personnel (D’Cruz 2005). It served as a signaling mechanism that the offeror was
not concealing a weapon. Particularly during wartime in medieval societies, the small per-
sonal effort of the physical act was easily outweighed by the mutual benefits of ensuring
peaceful discourse. The custom spread and today has become a very strong social norm
in Western culture that may lead to significant social sanctions if defied, although send-
ing a signal that an individual is unarmed is no longer applicable. However, hand-to-hand
contact is also recognized as one of the main channels for common infections; the H1N1
epidemic of 2009 led many school administrators in the United States to ban handshak-
ing at graduation ceremonies in that year, and more recent influenza scares prompted
the 2012 British Olympic team to shun this standard act of sportsmanship before events
(Neyfakh 2013). Yet, despite these isolated instances of imposed non-conformity and the
efforts of small activist groups such as the website www.StopHandshaking.com, the norm
remains a bastion of modern etiquette, and deviations from the norm tend to be pun-
ished. For instance, some salafist imams in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway refused
to shake hands with women, for which they received negative coverage in the press (e.g.
https://www.rt.com/news/402238-norway-debate-muslim-refuses-woman-handshake/).
3 We think that our results also shed light on situations where utility is derived from
conforming to one’s group identity instead of from a material payoff (Akerlof and Kranton
2000; Tajfel and Turner 1986, 1979). A raft of recent empirical evidence has demonstrated
that social identity can influence individual decision-making and behavior in a wide range
of respects, such as group problem-solving (Chen and Chen 2011), polarization of beliefs
(Hart and Nisbet 2011; Luhan et al 2009), preferences over outcomes (Charness et al 2007),
trust (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo 2009), redistribution preferences (Chen and Li 2009),
punishment behavior (Abbink et al 2010), discrimination (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001), self-
control (Inzlicht and Kang 2010), competitiveness (Gneezy et al 2009) and time horizons for
decision-making (Mannix and Loewenstein 1994). Several studies have successfully induced
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a relatively small group size and in which the benefits from coordinating are
large (with a strong ‘social value’ component), a setup that we conjecture
to be particularly conducive for bad social norms, we vary the information
about others’ preferences in two ways. First, we compare a version of the
game in which subjects are uncertain about others’ preferences with a version
in which subjects are fully informed. Second, in the version in which they are
uncertain about others’ preferences, we allow subjects to communicate about
their intended actions.
We use the version of the game with incomplete information about others’
preferences to investigate some other variables that are key in the approach of
Brock and Durlauf (2001). An essential component for the persistence of inef-
ficient social norms is a strong social value component. Group size is another
variable that plays a more subtle role according to our model.
The experimental results show that the information about others’ prefer-
ences is crucial for the emergence and persistence of bad norms. In agreement
with pluralistic ignorance, when subjects are fully informed about others’ pref-
erences, groups move swiftly away from a good equilibrium after it has become
bad. Allowing subjects to communicate also helps to break norms that have
become bad. Communication reduces the uncertainty about other subjects’
preferences and intended behavior. On the other hand, bad norms thrive when
subjects are uncertain about the payoffs of others.
While these results support the pluralistic ignorance perspective, other
experimental results accord well with the Brock and Durlauf approach. That
is, the stronger the social value component, the more likely a bad norm is to
persist. This result resonates with the finding in minimum effort games that it
is more difficult to coordinate on the good equilibrium when it is individually
more costly to do so (e.g., Devetag and Ortmann 2007). We find that smaller
groups are better at breaking bad norms in the short term, but across longer
horizons, this effect disappears.
Our paper contributes to a small related literature on the emergence and
persistence of bad norms. Devetag and Ortmann (2007) survey how bad out-
comes can emerge in team production processes that are characterized by a
minimum effort production function. In the minimum effort game, players
simultaneously exert costly effort, and the minimum effort in the team de-
termines its productivity. The stage game hosts a multitude of Pareto-ranked
equilibria. In agreement with risk dominance, subjects in experiments usually
quickly coordinate on a bad equilibrium that offers them a secure but low pay-
off, unless group size is very small (Van Huyck et al 1990; Knez and Camerer
1994).4 A special feature of the minimum effort game is that if only one “rot-
ten apple” provides low effort, all other players want to choose the same low
effort. In this sense the minimum effort game is not about norms, because it is
group identity directly in the lab to test for different effects; e.g., Chen and Chen (2011),
Charness et al (2007), Eckel et al (2007), among others.
4 It appears to be very hard to avoid bad outcomes in minimum effort games, but there
are some reliable factors that help subjects coordinate on better outcomes (Cachon and
Camerer 1996; Weber 2006; Chaudhuri et al 2009; Kopanyi-Peuker et al 2015)
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not a game where players want to follow what the majority in the group does.
In addition, in the game that we study in the experiment the good equilibrium
always risk-dominates the bad equilibrium, so risk dominance by itself cannot
explain the persistence of bad norms that we observe in some circumstances. In
a similar vein, Lim and Neary’s (2016) experimental investigation of stochas-
tic adjustment dynamics also uses a large binary-action population game, the
language game, in which individuals’ choices are strategic complements. They
find strong evidence that individuals behave consistently with a best-response
learning rule based on the previous period’s outcomes, which, in a noisy envi-
ronment, can lead to groups escaping coordination equilibria. The support for
their learning model neatly coincides with the expectations-formation process
we describe in Section 2.4. While our results are broadly consistent with this
literature, our game also yields different insights: in the game that we study
incomplete information on others’ preferences is needed for the persistence of
bad norms, while in the minimum effort and language games the bad outcome
results even with complete information about preferences.
More recently, Abbink et al (2017) identify an alternative driver of bad
norms. The central insight from their experiment is that punishment oppor-
tunities can, under certain circumstances, lead to socially destructive norms
being enforced in public good games. Specifically, in a linear public good game
where group members only marginally benefit from others’ contributions, such
that the socially optimal act is to not contribute, they find that subjects sup-
port a bad social norm when they have the possibility to punish free-riders.
The key difference between their approach and ours is that they study the
emergence of bad social norms in inefficient public good provision, whereas we
focus on pure coordination situations in which the question is whether groups
can move from one equilibrium to a better one.
Closely related to our paper in terms of experimental design is Andreoni
et al (2017). Their investigation of so-called ‘conformity traps’, conceived in-
dependently and concurrently, complements our approach. The most impor-
tant differences in design are the information environment and the payoffs
pertaining to individuals who deviate from a norm. Individuals in their ex-
periment know the true distribution and evolution of group preferences, such
that pluralistic ignorance cannot play a role. By comparison, in our setup the
individuals who deviate first from the current norm incur disproportionately
large costs for pioneering the change, creating stronger incentives to wait for
others to deviate first.5 A particularly relevant feature of their results is that
bad norms can still persist with full information over group preferences, so
long as the strength of social payoffs is sufficiently high. Other than that,
their main results are consistent with our own: (1) The scale of social payoffs,
relative to individualistic utility differences, is crucial for conformity to a bad
equilibrium, (2) Smaller groups can break a conformity trap faster, and (3)
Anonymous communication through polls can aid escaping a conformity trap.
5 Their design also differs in terms of the matching structure: in each round, matches are
pairwise with external payoffs for group conformity, rather than group coordination.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
game and some theoretical benchmarks. It shows how social value and social
interactions shape a unified, tractable theory of bad norms. The model’s im-
plications are derived both analytically and through simulation. In Section 3,
we detail the design and procedure used to transpose the model into the labo-
ratory. Section 4 discusses the experimental results, from which the conditions
under which bad norms can evolve and persist are demonstrated, and Section
5 concludes with a discussion of the results and implications.
2 Game and theoretical benchmarks
We adopt Brock and Durlauf’s (2001) model of discrete choice with social
interactions, with minor modifications, as a vehicle for investigating the per-
sistence of bad norms in an experiment. We augment their game to allow for
incomplete information about other players’ preferences and to allow prefer-
ences to change over time. We propose a simple dynamic belief-updating rule
that selects equilibria in the dynamic context. This analysis clarifies the cir-
cumstances under which we expect groups to experience a shift in equilibrium
when the payoffs of the game evolve. We start with an exposition of the full
information stage-game.
2.1 The full information stage-game
N players choose between two options. For example, teenagers in a social group
decide whether or not to smoke. A player’s payoff from the chosen option is
composed of her private value and her social value, which measures the congru-
ence between the player’s choice and those of the group. Every player knows
that each option’s private value is comprised of the sum of a common value
and a player-specific private shock. The (continuous) distributions generating
the private shocks for the two choices are known to all the players. In the full
information stage-game, players are informed of the common values for each
choice, and of their own private shocks for each choice (but not of the private
shocks of the others) at the start of the stage-game. In line with the approach
of Brock and Durlauf (2001), player i receives a payoff of:
V (ωi) = u(ωi) + S(ωi, ω¬i) + i(ωi), ωi ∈ {−1, 1} (1)
Here, ω represents the choice variable, taking the value of 1 (smoking)
or −1 (not smoking). u(ωi) represents the common value from i’s choice ωi,
and i(ωi) is a player choice-dependent shock. The shocks i(ωi) have a mean 0
and are identically and independently distributed across all players and choices
such that the difference i(−1) − i(1) has a known probability distribution
function F (·).
S(ωi, ω¬i) gives the social value of the choice that depends on player i’s
choice ωi and the choices of all other players ω¬i. In this game, the assumption
6 David Smerdon et al.
is made that the utility derived from social payoffs exhibits “constant and
totalistic strategic complementarity” (Brock and Durlauf 2001, p. 238), which
is also employed in Andreoni et al (2017)’s design. This means that players are
always happier by the same amount when one more person makes the same
choice as them. With this assumption, the form of social value is stipulated in
(2):
S(ωi, ω¬i) = Jωimi (2)
where mi =
∑
j 6=i
ωj
N−1 represents the average choice of the other players, and
J(> 0) represents the social factor, which weighs social utility relative to the
direct private-value payoff. To be very clear on terminology: a higher social
factor, J , increases i’s (positive) social value if her behavior conforms to the
majority choice, or decreases her (negative) social value if her behavior is in
the minority. Notice that the inclusion of the social value in the payoff ensures
that an individual is automatically punished if she deviates from the behavior
of others. This accords with the sanctions from deviations of Bicchieri’s (2017)
definition of social norms.
2.2 Equilibria of the full information stage-game
We define an equilibrium ρ∗ of the game as the expected proportion of the group
choosing ωi = −1, such that no player would be better off changing her choice
in expectation. It will be useful to write this in terms of the expected average
choice of the group, m∗ = 1N
N∑
i=1
ωi ∈ [−1, 1]. The equilibrium is therefore
specified by:
ρ∗ =
1−m∗
2
(3)
Players cannot ex ante observe mi but instead must base their decision on
an expectation of average group choice:
mei =
∑
j 6=i
Ei(ωj)
N − 1
where Ei(ωj) represents i’s expectation over j’s choice. In equilibrium,
players’ expectations are consistent with how others play the game. It is con-
venient to define d = u(−1) − u(1) as the difference in common values and
di = d+ i(−1)− i(1) as the difference in private values for player i. For ex-
ample, di represents i’s net private preference for not smoking in the absence
of peer effects, while d represents the average private preference for smoking
in the group.
We are only interested in situations in which social interactions affect be-
havior (in expectation), and so we restrict our analysis to the region −2J ≤
d ≤ 2J .
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Proposition 1 An equilibrium is characterized by the common threshold deci-
sion rule “Choose ωi = −1 if and only if di > c∗”, where the common threshold
is c∗ = 2Jm∗. An equilibrium expected average choice level of the group, m∗,
solves:
m∗ = 2F (2Jm∗ − d)− 1 (4)
where F is the CDF of the difference in private shocks.
We relegate the proof of Proposition 1 to the Appendix.
Equation (4) is the stage-game equilibria condition for the expected average
choice level, corresponding to a common threshold c∗, for any given distribu-
tion of shocks. This is a minor generalization of Brock and Durlauf (2001).6
The threshold c∗ depends both on a player’s beliefs about group behavior as
well as the (fixed) social value strength. It follows that a player i maximizing
her expected utility chooses ωi = −1 if di > 2Jmei .
There exists at least one equilibrium and, for strictly unimodal distribu-
tions, at most three equilibria satisfying (4).7 The number of equilibria depends
on both the social factor and the difference in common values: multiple equilib-
ria exist only when J is sufficiently large relative to d. Notice that bad norms
can only arise when multiple equilibria exist. In such cases, and adopting for
convenience the notation of (3), two stable equilibria close to the poles ρ∗− ≈ 0
and ρ∗+ ≈ 1 emerge.8 It is noteworthy that it is not required that all or even
any of the players have a private value preference for a particular choice for it
to exist as a pure equilibrium.
2.3 The incomplete information stage-game
Notably, players in the full information stage-game know both the distribu-
tion generating the private shocks for all individuals and the common values
for each choice. In practical applications, people may not have such detailed
information. Also, notice that the full information game does not give the
phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance a good shot: because players know the
common values, they can be quite certain about which choice will be preferred
6 In Brock and Durlauf (2001) the authors assume that shocks follow an extreme value
distribution. The convenient properties of this distribution allow for analytical computation
of rational expectations equilibria from the symmetry of N expectations equations.
7 A rigorous proof is somewhat laborious and we refer interested readers to similar tech-
niques discussed in detail in (among others) Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Rothenha¨usler
et al (2015).
8 Recall that ρ∗ is the expected proportion of the group choosing ωi = −1. Due to the
continuous distribution of the private shocks across all possible values on the real axis, there
is always a positive probability of a private difference |dit| > 2J , and so the equilibrium
proportions are never exactly at the poles 0 and 1. With some abuse of terminology, a
‘mixed-proportions’ equilibrium ρ∗= ∈ (ρ∗−, ρ∗+) also exists. In a setting where the parameter
space is such that three equilibria exist, the equilibria at the poles are stable whereas the
mixed-proportioned equilibrium is unstable. Small perturbations in players’ expectations
will move players away from this equilibrium.
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by the majority. Pluralistic ignorance receives a fairer shot in the incomplete
information stage-game. In this game, players do not separately observe the
common values or their individual shocks, but rather the combined private
value vi(ωi) = u(ωi) + i(ωi). We think that the analysis of the full informa-
tion stage-game also pertains to the incomplete information game if players
have come to know the common values from historical information or experi-
ence.
The analysis of the stage game indicates that both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ norms
can exist as equilibria so long as the scale of social payoffs is sufficiently large
with respect to the direct incentives. It does not provide any guidance on
predicting which equilibrium will be selected. For the game that we study in
this paper, risk dominance selects the ‘good’ equilibrium. The opportunity
cost for player i deviating from the good equilibrium is 2J + di, while the
opportunity cost for player i deviating from the bad equilibrium is 2J−di, and
therefore the good equilibrium risk-dominates the bad equilibrium.9 Thus, risk
dominance is not helpful to support our intuition that in certain circumstances
groups may shift from a bad to a good equilibrium while in other conditions
the bad equilibrium will persist. Our interest in bad social norms is precisely
this. To shed light on this, we turn to a dynamic analysis that can be tested
in the lab.
2.4 Dynamic Analysis
Here, we consider the possibility that the N players repeatedly play the full
information stage-game or the incomplete information stage-game. In either
case, it is known that new private shocks are independently drawn every round,
and that the (possibly unobserved) common values can change across rounds.
Therefore, it may be that the initially ‘good’ option (i.e. the option possessing
the higher common value) loses its attractiveness and becomes the ‘bad’ option
after some time. For example, new information about health consequences
causes most of the teenagers to privately prefer not to smoke.
We now describe a dynamic process that predicts the likelihood of the
emergence of each of the two stable equilibria under different conditions. This
process is then simulated for the parameter space of d and J in order to
motivate the choice of parameters for the laboratory experiment. We relegate
most of the analysis and simulations to the online appendix and provide a
brief summary below.
In the dynamic environment, we introduce a simple function for an individ-
ual’s belief formation meit in round t which allows players to form beliefs when
the environment changes and play is not (yet) in equilibrium. We assume that
this function depends on two pieces of information available to individuals:
9 This result depends on the linear payoff function used in our and Brock and Durlauf’s
(2001) model. To derive the condition for risk dominance in our game, we used the procedure
described in Section 3.1 of Keser et al (2012), who apply Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) tracing
procedure to a technology-adoption game.
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the difference in their private values, and the common historical ‘norm’, here
represented by the previous round’s group choice.10 meit is logically assumed
to be decreasing in dit and increasing in mt−1. We further assume that meit
is bounded from below at ψ = −1 for dit ≥ 2J and bounded from above at
ψ = 1 for dit ≤ −2J . That is, we focus on regions in which social interactions
matter.
A parsimonious expectations function satisfying these criteria is:
meit =
1
2
(
mt−1 − dit
2J
)
(5)
whereby players place equal weight on the current round’s private values
and the previous round’s group choice in forming their expectations.11 Note
that if the weight on dit2J had been 0 instead of
1
2 , the belief updating process
would have resembled the belief-learning and fictitious play models of Cheung
and Friedman (1997) and Hopkins et al (2005) (among others). According to
a pure belief-learning model, players would not respond to changes in their
private values because their expectations are only backward looking. Given
that in our game players know that the environment may change, it is plausibly
more likely that they pay attention to both past behavior of other players and
changes in the environment, as illustrated in (5).
We use (5) to impel the simulations that guide the parameter choices for
the experiment. We also vary the weighting in the simulations; these details
can be found in the online appendix. Consider a period of rounds in which the
difference in the common values, dt, is constant. The expectations-formation
process of (5) enables a researcher who knows the common values and the
distribution of the private shocks (though not their realizations) to predict
both the average group choice mt in a given round and the dynamically-stable
equilibria over the period.
We say that a bad norm persists when ρ∗ ≈ 0 is a possible equilibrium
during a sufficiently long period of time in which choice ωi = −1 is preferable
from a group welfare perspective. As long as the difference in common payoffs,
d, is large enough relative to the social factor, J , the only sustainable long-
run equilibrium in the system is the ‘good’ norm ρ∗ ≈ 1. However, when d
is small relative to J so that social value is relatively more important than
individualistic returns, two stable equilibria emerge: p∗ ≈ 0 and p∗ ≈ 1. Again,
the model makes clear predictions with regard to the social factor: The stronger
this factor, the more likely a bad norm is to persist.
Computer simulations of groups of rational players who form expectations
according to (5) shed light on bad norm persistence in our dynamic setting.12
10 Past history has been shown to play a role in equilibrium selection in similar coordination
games in the lab, which motivates and supports this dependence (Romero 2015; see also
Cason et al 2012, Huck et al 2011, Cooper and Kagel 2003).
11 We also considered a more general function with a free weighting parameter δ. We
estimated how δ changes with the treatments, and these results can be found in the online
appendix.
12 See the online appendix for details.
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They predict that if shocks follow a standard normal distribution and d ≈ 2
for a long period of time, a social factor of J = 4 enables a group to break
the bad norm. For a stronger social factor of J = 8, the bad norm persists.
As opposed to the static analysis, there are also interesting predictions with
respect to group size. Smaller groups are slightly more likely to break a bad
norm, and to do so faster, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions
of the dynamic analysis (see Appendix).
The most important feature of (5) is that it does not depend on whether
players are informed only of the sum of the common value and their pri-
vate shock, as in the incomplete information game, or of the two components
separately, as in the full information game. This suggests that the informa-
tion provided to the players is an interesting treatment variable. As in Brock
and Durlauf (2001), our theoretical extension does not differentiate between
whether players are partially or fully informed. On the other hand, the psychol-
ogy literature around pluralistic ignorance argues that partial ignorance of this
distribution is a necessary condition for the phenomenon to occur (Prentice
2007; Bicchieri 2005; Sherif 1936).
Another interesting possibility is that full information is endogenously gen-
erated through communication. Communication may play a dual role in our
game. It may not only help players share information about which choice they
prefer but it may also help players to coordinate expectations on the same
equilibrium. From this perspective, communication may have an even more
positive effect than full information.13 In our experiment, we are particularly
interested in anonymous signalling that one might expect from posting on in-
ternet bulletin boards or social media. While this cheap talk is non-binding, it
could be thought of as shifting the focus away from historical precedent and
towards illuminating present group preferences.
The theory provides a testable framework for the role of the social value in
perpetuating bad norms. Its predictions demonstrate that the precise condi-
tions under which a bad norm can persist, or pluralistic ignorance can emerge,
are not trivial. A laboratory experiment is an appropriate medium through
which to test these predictions.
3 Experimental design
The computerized experiment was run at the CREED laboratory of the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. Subjects read the instructions at their own pace and
13 Andreoni et al (2017) find a positive effect of communication on equilibrium selection in
a similar environment. Choi and Lee (2014) find that coordination is enhanced by allowing
communication in networks. However, in their experiment the roles of implicit agreement and
punishment from deviations are necessary for improving coordination. Ochs (2008) shows
that the effect of communication can differ in different coordination games; interestingly,
this paper also highlights the role of past precedent, a mechanism that in our experiment
corresponds to the strength of the bad norm.
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then had to successfully answer some control questions before they could pro-
ceed.14 In the experiment, subjects earned points that were converted at the
end of each session at an exchange rate of five points for one euro cent (500
points = 1 euro). At the start of the experiment, each subject was randomly
assigned to a group and participated in 50 rounds of the game. Subjects were
not told how many rounds the game would last. Points were summed over
the 50 rounds and the final game earnings were paid privately. In addition,
subjects received a show-up fee of 3 euros.
Recruitment was conducted at the University of Amsterdam. Each sub-
ject participated in only one session of the experiment. Each session took
approximately one hour. Multiple groups were run in each session, but the
composition of the groups themselves remained constant. In total, 346 sub-
jects participated in 19 sessions, and earned on average 14.30 euros (s.d. 2.00),
including the show-up fee.
We start with a description of the incomplete information treatments. The
game used in the experiment featured 50 rounds of the stage game of the model
described in the previous section, but presented in a more subject-friendly
manner. In each round players made an individual choice between two ‘doors’,
A and B, from which they could earn points. An individual’s payoff depended
both on her private value and her social value. Each door’s private value,
which an individual observed before making the choice, consisted of the sum
of that door’s common value and an individual shock. Group members could
not observe the components of their private values, but they knew both that
the common values were the same for all group members in a given round, and
that all shocks were randomly drawn from a standard normal distribution.
Social value was determined by the proportion of other group members
who made the same choice as an individual, scaled by a social factor; if an
individual was in the minority, the social value was negative. Specifically, the
social value to a participant was formulated in terms of the number of points
she would gain (lose) for each group member who made the same (different)
choice as her in a given round.
After the choices by all subjects were submitted in a given round, the
payoffs were presented along with information about the number of other
group members who chose each door. The experiment then continued to the
next round, and subjects saw their new private values for the doors.
The common door values used in the experiments were randomly generated
in order to create appropriate conditions for testing bad norms and to coincide
with the theoretical analysis and simulations. Figure 1 shows how the common
door values developed over time in each group of each treatment. Specifically,
unknown to the subjects,
– Door A was initially preferred by a large margin (roughly 6 points)
14 The Appendix lists the instructions for the incomplete information treatment with N =
6, J = 4 (“SmallWeak”), as well as for the Communication and Full Information treatments.
Instructions for the other treatments differed from SmallWeak only with respect to the
parameter values.
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Fig. 1 Common door values
Notes: For participants in the laboratory experiment, all values were multiplied by 10.
– Common values of each door could change by a maximum of 1 point in
each new round
– Door A remained preferable until round 25, after which Door B overtook
Door A
– From round 40 until the end of the session, Door B held a positive difference
over Door A of approximately 2 points.
These stipulations were designed to create an environment in which in the
first half of the session, a social norm of choosing Door A could emerge, which
would then consistently be the socially inefficient choice in the second half.
To make things easier for subjects to understand, the linear nature of the
social value was explained in terms of the number of points earned per other
player making the same choice. The actual presentation of the instructions
multiplied all common and private values from the theoretical model by 10
so that subjects did not have to calculate decimals. We continue to use the
unmultiplied values in the rest of the paper for consistency. For example, in the
treatment with N = 6 and J = 4 (“SmallWeak”), the instructions contained
the sentence:
You gain 8 points for every person who makes the same choice as
you, but you lose 8 points for every person who makes the opposite
choice to you.
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Notice that in the experiment, like in the theoretical model, an individual
i thus receives a payoff according to (1) in round t, where ωit = 1 is defined
as choosing Door A, ωit = −1 as choosing Door B, mit is the average choice
of the others in the group, and J is the social factor.
All treatments made use of the experimental variant of the game described
above. In the Full Information treatment we replicated the parameters of the
SmallStrong treatment (N = 6, J = 8), but gave subjects full information
about the true distribution of others’ private preferences. Specifically, sub-
jects could precisely see the decomposition of their private values into the
common values and their own personal shocks for each door in every round.
Subjects were not informed of the specific shocks for the other group members,
but knew the distribution generating the draws. The dynamic model of the
previous section does not differentiate between the setups of FullInformation
and SmallStrong in its predictions. The bad norm is expected to persist in ei-
ther treatment. The psychological literature on pluralistic ignorance, however,
argues that uncertainty over the true distribution of private preferences is an
important condition for this phenomenon to exist (Prentice 2007).
The Communication treatment replicated the information structure and
parameters of the SmallStrong treatment, but allowed subjects to communi-
cate. In every round before they chose their door, each subject could express
her intention on a ‘Bulletin Board’. Posts on the Bulletin Board were anony-
mous. Subjects were informed that there was no obligation to honor a post, and
that it was also possible not to post anything. After everyone had made their
decisions about posting for that round, group-members saw the total number
of posts (or ‘intentions to choose’) for Door A and Door B before they actually
made their final choice of door. We expected the Communication treatment
to be at least as successful as the Full Information treatment in breaking bad
norms, because it allowed subjects to coordinate their expectations of which
choice would attract the majority in the group.
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the treatments.15 These were
varied between subjects, with the three additional treatments based on com-
binations of the two parameters of interest: the social factor and the group
size.
Private shocks were randomly drawn from ∼ N (0, 1) for each individual,
door and round. Realizations of private shock distributions for each individ-
ual were matched for treatments with the same group size. That is, each of
the 8 groups in SmallWeak had a matched group in SmallStrong with the
same private shocks distributed across group members, doors and rounds, and
likewise for the 7 groups in each of the larger treatments. In each round of
each treatment, subjects’ screens displayed the round number, the cumulative
earnings, the private values for each door, a choice button for Door A or Door
15 The group sizes (N = 6, 11) were chosen to make it easier for subjects to calculate the
potential social values, which required considering fractions of 5 or 10. The social factors
(J = 4, 8) were chosen so as to predict opposite equilibria in computer simulations whereby
individuals are assumed to assign equal weights to both the existing norm and their own
private information in forming their expectations. See the online appendix for further details.
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Table 1 Treatments
Social factor Group size #Groups Bulletin Common
Treatment J N board? info?
SmallWeak 4 6 8 No No
SmallStrong 8 6 8 No No
BigWeak 4 11 7 No No
BigStrong 8 11 7 No No
Communication 8 6 8 Yes No
Full Information 8 6 8 No Yes
B to be submitted, and a history footer. The history footer contained the to-
tal history of the proportion of other group members making each choice for
every completed round.16 At the end of round 50, subjects filled out a short
questionnaire before they were paid. Below we summarize the main hypotheses
that our treatments allow us to test.
Hypothesis 1 Bad norms are more easily broken when subjects receive com-
plete information about the common values and their own private shocks.
Hypothesis 2 Bad norms are more easily broken when there is a possibility
to anonymously communicate intended choices.
Hypothesis 3 With incomplete information, groups are more likely to stay
with choosing Door A after it has become the bad norm when J = 8 than when
J = 4.
Hypothesis 4 With incomplete information, groups are equally likely to stay
with choosing Door A after it has become the bad norm when N = 6 or 11.
4 Results
We present the results in two parts. Section 4.1 investigates the role that infor-
mation and pluralistic ignorance play for the persistence of bad norms. Section
4.2 provides the results of the additional treatments. It clarifies what plays a
role in the development of bad norms when there is incomplete information.
4.1 Pluralistic ignorance: the role of full information in breaking bad norms
A comparison of the SmallStrong treatment, the Full Information treatment
and the Communication treatment allows us to shed light on pluralistic ig-
norance. Figure 2 shows when groups on average switch to the good norm in
16 An example screenshot is displayed in the Appendix.
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Fig. 2 Average round-by-round group choice for N = 6, J = 8, including anonymous
communication and decomposed private values (full information) treatments
Notes: Each treatment line depicts the average group proportion choosing Door B across
all groups in the treatment. After round 25, coordination on Door A represents a bad social
norm. Lines have been smoothed via a three-round equally weighted moving average.
these treatments (if they do). Notably, the bad norm was not broken in any
of the groups in the SmallStrong treatment, in which the strong social factor
provides favorable conditions for the persistence of bad norms. Providing full
information on the decomposition of common values and private shocks in the
game with the same parameters dramatically changes the picture. All groups
broke the bad norm in both the Full Information and Communication treat-
ments, a significant improvement over groups in SmallStrong (p = .00 for
both pairwise rank-sum tests; see Table 2). In the Full Information treatment,
most groups switched to the good norm in round 26, immediately after the
common values shifted towards Door B, and all groups switched to the good
norm by round 28. Remarkably, all groups also broke the bad norm almost im-
mediately in the Communication treatment, despite the shift of the common
values being unobserved. These results accord with psychological theories of
social norms that propose that payoff uncertainty of other group members is
a crucial ingredient for bad norm persistence.
While we did not explicitly measure expectations, we can identify extreme
circumstances where we might observe behavior consistent with pluralistic ig-
norance. Specifically, if all individuals in a group have a private value of Door
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Table 2 Key performance indicators by treatment
Treatments ρ50 ρ¯(45−50) ρ¯(t≥26) ρ¯all t¯switch
Full Information 1.00 1.00 .93 .48 26
Communication 1.00 1.00 .92 .47 27
SmallStrong .00 .00 .03 .03 -
SmallWeak .65 .62 .46 .26 30
BigStrong .03 .02 .02 .02 -
BigWeak .47 .36 .26 .14 39
Testing information uncertainty: FI vs SS .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** -
Testing communication: C vs SS .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** -
Testing social factor:
SW vs SS .00*** .00*** .01*** .01*** -
BW vs BS .02** .04** .11 .06* -
Testing group size:
SW vs BW .46 .41 .30 .30 .17
SS vs BS .12 .02** .82 .56 -
Notes: In the upper panel, values are averages of the group values within each treatment.
ρ50 is the final group proportion choosing Door B. ρ¯(45−50) is the average ρ across the
last six rounds. ρ¯all is the average ρ across all rounds. ρ¯(t≥26) is the average ρ from round
26, when the common value of Door B becomes larger than that of Door A. t¯switch is the
average switching time, considering only those groups that switched to Door B by round 50.
In the lower panels, p-values are derived from Mann-Whitney rank sum tests. In the tests,
each group yields one observation. Full indicators by group are found in the Appendix.
B exceeding that of Door A in a particular round of the experiment, but all
group members choose Door A (ρ = 0), the group is said to exhibit total plural-
istic ignorance. Such incidence represents the worst-case scenario from a social
welfare perspective; in fact, if social value is ignored, any other combination
of choices would be a Pareto improvement. In the experiment the number of
rounds in which total pluralistic ignorance could potentially exist is naturally
higher for smaller groups, as groups with more individuals are more likely to
produce at least one group member realizing extreme private shocks. Figure 3
compares the number of potential rounds of total pluralistic ignorance to those
that eventuated in the experiment. This reveals a strong social factor effect.
SmallStrong and BigStrong saw total pluralistic ignorance in, respectively,
an average of 87% and 81% of each treatment’s potential rounds, while for
SmallWeak and BigWeak the average frequencies were 27% and 31%. On the
other hand, in both the Communication and FullInformation treatments,
no group ever exhibited total pluralistic ignorance for any round, a significant
difference to the behavior in the comparison treatment SmallStrong (p = .00
for both pairwise rank-sum tests).
In the Communication treatment, only two of the 48 participants chose not
to use the Bulletin Board at all; of the rest, most subjects took the opportunity
to post in every round. Moreover, the collection of posts on the Bulletin Board
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Fig. 3 Mean potential and realized rounds of total pluralistic ignorance.
Notes: A ‘total pluralistic ignorance’ round is defined as a round t in which all players receive
dit > 0 and subsequently choose Door A (ρt = 0). Amounts are averages per group out of
a total of 50 rounds.
was overwhelmingly indicated as the primary means of expectation formation
in the answers to the questionnaire. Figure 4 presents the average number of
announcements to opt for Door B together with the actual choices for Door
B as the rounds unfolded. For all eight groups, the switch in average group
indications from Door A to Door B coincided with the shift in the difference
in common values. Interestingly, all participants exploited the anonymity by
acting contrary to their posted indication in at least one round (mean = 5.3
rounds, s.d. = 2.4).
The above analysis supports the first two key results regarding the role of
full information on preferences and communication:
RESULT 1: In agreement with pluralistic ignorance, bad norms persist
when subjects are uncertain about others’ preferences but not when subjects
are fully informed.
RESULT 2: Communication always breaks the bad norm.
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Fig. 4 Indications and actual choices in the Communication treatment, by group
Notes: Average round-by-round group indications for “Door B” versus actual choices in the
Communication treatment. Treatment parameters were: N = 6, J = 8. Almost all subjects
in a group posted their intentions in every round (mean = 5.6 group members, s.d. = 0.6).
Lines have been smoothed via a three-round equally weighted moving average.
4.2 The roles of the social factor and group size when there is incomplete
information
Figure 5 displays the frequency of norm breaking in the treatments with in-
complete information. None of the groups with the strong social factor (J = 8)
switched to Door B by round 50, regardless of group size. When the social fac-
tor was weakened to J = 4, five out of the eight groups (62.5%) in SmallWeak
switched to Door B, while three out of seven (42.9%) did the same in the
BigWeak treatment. The simulations of the theoretical model for the common
values, shocks and treatments used in the experiment also predicted a slight
favoritism for SmallWeak compared to BigWeak for the sequence of common
values used.
Table 2 demonstrates that the descriptive statistics of the data partitioned
by treatment are similar when norm breaking is defined by different measures,
such as the average ρ across all rounds, the final rounds, or rounds 26-50
(the rounds after which the common value of Door B overtakes that of Door
A). Detailed proportions for the 46 individual groups can be found in the
Appendix. For each individual group, the average group choice stuck closely
to the two theoretical stage-game equilibria of ρ = 0 and 1 across the rounds;
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Fig. 5 Switching groups by treatment
Notes: ‘Switching’ is defined as more than half of the group choosing Door B in round 50
(ρ50 > 0.5).
groups spent few rounds in the socially destructive mixed proportions around
ρ = 0.5. For the groups that finally broke the norm, once approximately a
third of the group had simultaneously chosen Door B the group generally took
little time in reaching the more favorable equilibrium.
The third key result reflects our hypothesis regarding the strength of the
social factor. The upper panel of Table 2 clarifies that the social factor has a
substantial impact on the proportion switching to the good door in the latter
part of the experiment. When J is strong, all groups stay with Door A after
it has become the bad choice. The lower panels of Table 2 show the extent to
which the results differ systematically across treatments. An increase in the
social factor significantly enhances various measures of ρ for both N = 6 and
N = 11.
RESULT 3: With uncertainty, bad norms are more likely to persist when
the group’s social factor is strong.
The result is further illustrated in Figure 6. Only groups with the weaker
social factor switched their overall door preference after round 25. The figure
also reveals that groups of size N = 6 that switched to Door B generally did
so earlier than the switching groups of size N = 11, although these short-run
size effects disappeared by the end of the 50 rounds.
The final key result concerns the role of group size. This has a much smaller
effect on the persistence of the bad norms. The tests on group size reported
20 David Smerdon et al.
Fig. 6 Effect of the social factor and group size on group choice
Notes: The figure shows the average round-by-round group choice for treatments with in-
formation uncertainty and no communication. This highlights the effect of the social factor
J and group size N on group choices. Each treatment line depicts the average group pro-
portion choosing Door B across all groups in the treatment. Lines have been smoothed via
a three-round equally weighted moving average.
in the lower panel of Table 2 tend to be insignificant. When only the weaker
social factor groups are considered, the graphical representation of round-by-
round pooled data presented in Figure 6, when broken by group size, does
suggest faster deviations from the norm for N = 6. However, it is conceivable
that the two lines would have converged if the experiment had been extended
beyond 50 rounds, so it is impossible to claim a long term group size effect on
the eventual persistence or collapse of bad norms.
RESULT 4: With uncertainty, the persistence of bad norms does not
depend on group size in the long run.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that individuals are less willing to go
against the norm when within larger groups in the short term. In the first
20 rounds, for example, although the common value of Door A was always
preferred, some individuals received private shocks such that there was an
individual incentive to deviate from the norm. Subjects were significantly more
likely to deviate when group size was smaller, as evidenced from rank-sum tests
of the averaged ρ of rounds 1-20, by group size (J=4: Mann-Whitney p = 0.03;
J=8: Mann-Whitney p = 0.02).
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Table 3 Deviation statistics during bad norm persistence by treatment
SmallWeak SmallStrong BigWeak BigStrong
Frequency of deviation rounds 27.5% 15.8% 34.7% 21.7%
Average ρ in deviation rounds 0.191 0.183 0.143 0.109
Notes: Values are averages of the group values within each treatment, restricted to rounds
of bad norm persistence (ρ < 0.5). Frequency of deviation rounds is calculated by dividing
the number of rounds with deviations by the total number of rounds with ρ < 0.5.
This generates support for the mechanism predicted by the model to cause
some short-run size effects. Holding social factor strength and other parameters
constant, the model predicts that, while the bad norm persists, larger groups
will more frequently experience rounds with at least one person deviating, but
that these rounds will on average have a lower ρ. Table 3 shows that when we
control for J , the experimental results confirm these predictions.
Interestingly, for ρ¯(1−20) the measure generating tangible short-run size
effects, social factor strength, was not found to be significant. This suggests
that in these early rounds when Door A is still commonly preferable, it is
the size of the group, rather than the social factor, that determines subjects’
predilection to deviate for individual reasons. However, the severity of the
loss that usually follows for a subject who decides to deviate depends on the
social factor (manifested in the social value). This severity then determines
the likelihood that the individual returns to the group choice or continues to
deviate in the subsequent round. To sum up, the evidence suggests that social
factor strength is chiefly responsible for whether a bad norm persists, while
group size plays a role in the short term and in determining the speed of a
norm shift.17
5 Discussion
When there is uncertainty about the preferences of others, bad norms can
persist in the laboratory. Bad norms emerge in our experiment as a result of
17 Groups that do not stay with the bad norm appear to benefit from the presence of
‘Leaders’. Leaders are defined as individuals who choose Door B in two consecutive rounds
t, t+ 1 when ρt−1, ρt < 0.5. They may be thought of as sacrificing personal gain in order to
signal the group and put pressure on the norm, and their presence is highly correlated with
breaking down the norm. None of the ten groups in which no Leader emerged managed to
switch to Door B. Whether the presence of Leaders is in itself conducive to collapsing a bad
norm is an open question, as clear endogeneity issues are present. However, controlling for
the social factor, there is a strong positive correlation between the proportion of Leaders
in a group and the collapse of the bad norm. The difference in the percentage of Leaders
for groups that persist with choosing Door A or eventually switch to Door B is highly
significant (Mann-Whitney p=.01). See also Andreoni et al (2017), in which exogenously
rewarding deviations from a bad equilibrium in the lab has a positive effect on breaking
so-called conformity traps.
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a good equilibrium gradually becoming a bad equilibrium in a coordination
structure due to changing payoffs over time. Once established, these bad norms
can persist so long as the personal incentives to deviate are small and the social
factor is strong.
The most important insight from our experiment is that a strong interde-
pendence of payoffs is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the persis-
tence of bad norms. That is, when a strong social factor is paired with full
information about the preferences of others, bad norms disappear. This is con-
sistent with insights from psychology, specifically that uncertainty about the
true distribution of the private preferences of group members is a necessary
condition for pluralistic ignorance to persist. A similarly positive effect results
from costless communication. The latter is particularly relevant to several ap-
plications of bad norms where tools such as social media can play a role. We
reason from our empirical findings that an important condition for bad norm
persistence is uncertainty about others’ private preferences.
The effect of uncertainty about preferences on the persistence of bad norms
was not predicted by our straightforward extension of the Brock and Durlauf
(2001) model. Still, our extension serves its purpose to organize the data of
the incomplete information treatments. In agreement with the model, smaller
groups have a better chance of collectively breaking a bad norm in the short
term, but over a longer horizon the prospects between differently sized groups
even out. More importantly, the model also accommodates the significant role
that the social factor plays: the stronger the incentive to conform to the major-
ity, the harder it is to break a bad social norm. We therefore see a use for the
model in explaining bad social norms, and suggest that future theoretical work
aims to incorporate the implications of pluralistic ignorance. One approach is
to allow the belief formation function to depend on the uncertainty of infor-
mation. When there is full information, players should place less weight on the
previous norm and more on the current preferences of others when forming
their expectations about future group behavior. Correspondingly, bad norm
persistence should require uncertainty about others’ preferences, in agreement
with pluralistic ignorance.
Our paper suggests other interesting avenues for future research. Our ex-
perimental design automatically monetizes all payoffs that derive from the
behavior of the self and others. Further research into applications that feature
internalized social payoffs could consider directly triggering group identity in
the laboratory, along the lines of Chen and Chen (2011), Charness et al (2007)
etc. What a more natural setting of this nature loses in robustness would be
compensated by adding support to the behavioral foundations of the modeling
of bad social norms proposed in this paper. Our results also motivate a need
for further tests in the field, and suggest that bad norm interventions that
target uncertainty are worthy of consideration.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Table of results
Table 4 Key performance indicators by group
Group Treatment N J ρ50 ρ¯(45−50) ρ¯all ρ¯(t≥26) tswitch Earnings(AC) Leaders(%) Testers(%)
1 Full Information 6 8 1.00 1.00 .49 .93 26 12.32 33.33 50.00
2 Full Information 6 8 1.00 1.00 .47 .91 26 12.38 0.00 100.00
3 Full Information 6 8 1.00 .97 .49 .94 26 12.49 0.00 83.33
4 Full Information 6 8 1.00 1.00 .51 .99 26 13.49 0.00 100.00
5 Full Information 6 8 1.00 1.00 .49 .96 26 13.22 0.00 83.33
6 Full Information 6 8 1.00 1.00 .44 .87 27 12.48 16.67 83.33
7 Full Information 6 8 1.00 1.00 .46 .88 28 12.04 16.67 83.33
8 Full Information 6 8 1.00 1.00 .50 .98 26 13.45 0.00 100.00
9 Communication 6 8 1.00 1.00 .44 .87 27 13.42 0.00 100.00
10 Communication 6 8 1.00 1.00 .49 .95 27 13.65 0.00 100.00
11 Communication 6 8 1.00 .97 .50 .93 26 11.98 16.67 50.00
12 Communication 6 8 1.00 1.00 .49 .98 26 13.70 0.00 83.33
13 Communication 6 8 1.00 1.00 .44 .88 28 13.67 33.33 66.67
14 Communication 6 8 1.00 1.00 .44 .86 26 12.83 0.00 100.00
15 Communication 6 8 1.00 1.00 .45 .87 27 13.10 33.33 66.67
16 Communication 6 8 1.00 1.00 .50 .99 26 13.79 0.00 100.00
17 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .03 .02 - 12.39 16.67 66.67
18 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .05 .07 - 11.77 16.67 50.00
19 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .02 .01 - 12.78 0.00 50.00
20 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .05 .06 - 11.77 33.33 16.67
21 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .01 .00 - 12.90 0.00 33.33
22 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .02 .00 - 12.49 16.67 50.00
23 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .03 .03 - 12.38 16.67 33.33
24 SmallStrong 6 8 .00 .00 .02 .01 - 12.72 0.00 33.33
25 SmallWeak 6 4 .00 .00 .04 .03 - 8.76 0.00 100.00
26 SmallWeak 6 4 .17 .06 .03 .03 - 8.76 0.00 66.67
27 SmallWeak 6 4 .00 .00 .03 .04 - 8.84 0.00 83.33
28 SmallWeak 6 4 1.00 .97 .27 .49 38 8.39 33.33 66.67
29 SmallWeak 6 4 1.00 1.00 .42 .79 30 8.91 16.67 83.33
30 SmallWeak 6 4 1.00 1.00 .46 .85 28 8.69 33.33 66.67
31 SmallWeak 6 4 1.00 1.00 .32 .62 35 9.21 33.33 33.33
32 SmallWeak 6 4 1.00 .94 .48 .84 17 8.09 16.60 66.67
33 BigStrong 11 8 .00 .02 .02 .02 - 12.82 9.09 36.36
34 BigStrong 11 8 .00 .00 .03 .04 - 12.28 9.09 36.36
35 BigStrong 11 8 .09 .06 .02 .02 - 12.80 9.09 36.36
36 BigStrong 11 8 .00 .02 .03 .03 - 12.38 18.18 18.18
37 BigStrong 11 8 .00 .00 .04 .04 - 12.04 27.27 27.27
38 BigStrong 11 8 .00 .00 .01 .00 - 13.09 0.00 27.27
39 BigStrong 11 8 .09 .02 .02 .02 - 12.58 0.00 63.64
40 BigWeak 11 4 .09 .02 .01 .01 - 9.07 0.00 54.55
41 BigWeak 11 4 1.00 .98 .40 .76 32 8.97 45.45 54.55
42 BigWeak 11 4 .91 .41 .10 .18 49 8.45 45.45 45.45
43 BigWeak 11 4 1.00 .98 .32 .62 36 8.99 45.45 45.45
44 BigWeak 11 4 .00 .00 .02 .01 - 9.00 0.00 63.64
45 BigWeak 11 4 .09 .05 .06 .09 - 8.56 36.36 36.36
46 BigWeak 11 4 .18 .09 .07 .12 - 8.48 27.27 63.64
Notes: Values are averages group values. Earnings do not include the AC3 show-up fee. ρ50 =
final group proportion choosing Door A. ρ¯(45−50) = average ρ across the last six rounds.
ρ¯all = average ρ across all rounds. ρ¯(t≥26) = average ρ from round 26, when the common
value of Door B becomes larger than that of Door A. tswitch is the first round in which
switching groups switched to Door B. Testers and Leaders are percentages of the respective
individual types: Testers deviate from the group norm in one round before reverting back
to the group choice, while Leaders deviate from the group norm in at least two consecutive
rounds. Highlighted rows are those groups defined as having switched to Door B by the end
of the experiment.
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6.2 Proofs
Stage-game equilibria
It follows from the decision rule specified in Proposition 1 that, in equilibrium,
we require that players prefer ωi = 1 at least as much as ωi = −1 if di < c∗,
that players prefer ωi = −1 at least as much as ωi = 1 if di > c∗ and, in
particular, that a player is exactly indifferent between ωi = −1 and 1 if she
draws private values with a difference equal to the threshold c∗. We use this
latter property of the equilibrium to endogenously calculate the threshold.
The threshold c∗ depends both on an individual’s beliefs about group be-
havior as well as the (fixed) social factor. Solving for this threshold allows us
to compute a general equilibria condition that holds for any given distribution
of the private shocks. Then an individual i maximizing her expected utility
chooses ωi = −1 if di > 2Jmei . To endogenously solve for an equilibrium, we
first rewrite mei as:
mei =
1
N − 1
N−1∑
k=0
((
N − 1
k
)
pk(1− p)(N−1−k)(2k −N + 1)
)
(6)
where p is the probability of a single draw of di < c
∗ so that i chooses ωi = 1.
Then each term in the series is the expected value for each possible value of
mi, which can be written in the form
2k−N+1
N−1 for each k ∈ {0, N − 1}.
Letting me∗i be the equilibrium expected average choice of the others in
a group, corresponding to a threshold c∗, we can rewrite c∗ = 2Jme∗i in (6).
Then solving for an individual i drawing exactly di = c
∗ with V (−1) = V (1)
allows us to solve endogenously for the expectation me∗i = m
e∗
j ∀i, j:
me∗i =
1
N − 1
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F (2Jme∗i −d)k(1−F (2Jme∗i −d))(N−1−k)(2k−N+1)
(7)
At first sight, an individual’s expectations appears to depend on the size of
the group, N . We perform the replacements M = N−1 and F = F (2Jme∗i −d)
for notational convenience to rewrite (7) as:
me∗i =
1
M
M∑
k=0
(
M
k
)
F k(1− F )(M−k)(2k −M) (8)
It can be shown that the sum of this series is independent of group size
as follows: Let k be a binomially-distributed random variable with parameters
n = M,p = F . Then E(k) = MF and so the right-hand side of (8) simplifies
to 2F − 1.
Thus, (7) can be rewritten as me∗i = 2F (2Jm
e∗
i − d) − 1, which notably
does not depend on N . Similarly, the researcher’s prediction of the expected
average choice level of the whole group solves:
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m∗ = 2F (2Jm∗ − d)− 1 (9)
Effect of group size
While group size does not influence the stage-game equilibria, it may still
affect the probability of a group switching from a bad equilibrium to a good
equilibrium in a given round. Consider a scenario in which the bad norm
ωit = 1 is persistent on account of relatively large J and m
e
it, such that in the
majority of rounds ρit = 0. Ex-ante, the probability of an individual choosing
ωit = −1 in a given round t is ρˆt, regardless of the group size. Now consider
the rounds in which 0 < ρit < 0.5; that is, the bad norm ωi = 1 is still in
effect but at least one group member receives a private shock difference large
enough to induce choosing ωit = −1. This likelihood is not the same across
group sizes. The probability that at least one group member chooses ωit = −1
increases with N , and so we would expect a higher proportion of rounds with
ρit 6= 0 in larger groups while the bad norm persists. However, the marginal
effect of a group member choosing ωit = −1 on the overall group proportion
ρit decreases with N , and so of those rounds where ρit 6= 0 while the bad norm
persists, we would expect that ρit is higher on average for smaller groups.
Now, assume there is some ‘tipping proportion’ ρ˜ that, if reached after
a previous equilibrium of full conformity to the bad norm (ρ∗ ≈ 0), would
result in a switch to the ‘good’ equilibrium ρ∗ ≈ 1 with almost certainty. The
tipping proportion is greater than the predicted group proportion ρˆt so that
on expectation it should not be breached in a given round. Then, after a round
in which ρt−1 ≈ 0, the probability of reaching the tipping proportion in round
t is the probability that at least Nρ˜ individuals choose ωit = −1. From the
researcher’s perspective, the number of individuals choosing ωit = −1 follows
a binomial distribution so that Nρt ∼ B(N, ρˆt) and hence:
Pr (ρt ≥ ρ˜) = 1− Pr (ρt < ρ˜)
= 1−
bNρ˜c∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
ρˆjt (1− ρˆt)N−j (10)
where bNρ˜c is the largest integer less than Nρ˜.
This function does not change monotonically with N . However, some idea
can be garnered as to how the probability is affected across general size in-
creases. The binomial distribution can be approximated by a normal distribu-
tion with mean Nρˆt and variance Nρˆt(1 − ρˆt) when Nρˆt > 5. Assuming this
is met, equation (10) can be approximated by:
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Pr (ρt ≥ ρ˜) = 1− Pr
(
N(ρt − ρˆt)√
Nρˆt(1− ρˆt)
<
N(ρ˜− ρˆt)√
Nρˆt(1− ρˆt)
)
≈ 1− Φ
(√
N
ρ˜− ρˆt√
ρˆt(1− ρˆt)
)
(11)
which, for ρ˜ > ρˆt, is a decreasing function of N .
When a bad norm is in effect, smaller groups are thus generally more
likely to breach the tipping proportion in a given round. The effect of size on
persistence increases slowly and not monotonically, although comparisons can
be made for sizes that are not very close together. This is due to the discrete
nature of the possible proportions and hence the upper sum limit bNρ˜c.
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6.3 Instructions for SmallWeak (N=6, J=4 )
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. Please read the following
instructions carefully. When everyone has finished reading the instructions and
before the experiment starts, you will receive a handout with a summary of
the instructions. At the start of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned
to a group of 6 participants. Throughout the experiment you will stay in the
same group. You will play a number of rounds (at least 30, but not more
than 80) in which you will make decisions. In the experiment, you will receive
a starting capital of 1500 points. In addition, you earn and sometimes lose
points with your decisions in the rounds. These amounts will be added to (or
subtracted from) your starting capital. At the end of the experiment, your
final point earnings will be exchanged for euros. Five points will be exchanged
for 1 eurocent. Therefore 500 points will earn one euro.
Each round, every participant in the group will make a decision between
“Door A” and “Door B”. The payoff you receive from choosing a particular
door in a round will be the sum of two parts, based on:
– Your private value for the door (which could be positive, zero or nega-
tive), and
– Your social value for the door (which could also be positive, zero or
negative).
Private value
At the start of each round, you will be informed of your own private value for
each door. Private values are generated as follows: At the start of a round,
we will draw common values for each door, which no subject can see and
which may change in each new round. The common value for a door will be
the same for every participant in your group. However, the two doors will
most often have different common values. For each door, we will then draw
individual shocks for each participant, which again no subject can see. For
each door, every participant’s private shock is randomly drawn from a normal
distribution (with an average value of 0 and a standard deviation of 10). The
graph below clarifies how frequently different private shocks occur.
Each participant receives an independent private shock for each door.
Therefore, the private shocks for one participant usually differ from the pri-
vate shocks of the other participants. We then add the common value for each
door to your private shock for that door, which gives you your private value.
Therefore, for each door, your private value could be higher or lower than the
average private value of your group. No other participant can see your private
values.
Social value
Your social value in a round depends on how many other people in your group
make the same door choice as you. You gain if the majority of the other
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participants make the same choice as you, but you make a loss if the majority
makes the other choice. Specifically, you gain 8 points for every person who
makes the same choice as you, but you lose 8 points for every person who
makes the opposite choice to you. As there are five other people in your
group, you can get a maximum social value of 40 points if everyone chooses
the same door as you, or you can maximally lose 40 points if everyone chooses
the other door to you.
The other participants in your group face the same decision as you do.
That is, they receive similar information as you do (although their private
values will most likely differ), they also choose between Door A and Door B
and they make money in the same way as you do.
Example
In this game, there are 5 other participants in your group. So, for example, if
you choose Door A with a private value of 60 points and 4 others also choose
Door A, your payoff equals your private value (60) plus a social value (32
- 8 = 24), for a total of 84 points.
If on the other hand you choose Door B with a private value of 50 points
and the 5 others choose Door A, your payoff equals your private value (50)
minus a social value of 40 points, for a total of 10 points.
Sequence of events
Summing up, each round is characterised by this sequence of events:
– At the start of each round, you are told your private values for the doors.
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Fig. 8 Screenshot of individual in SmallWeak treatment
Notes: Screenshot is taken from the start of round 5. The history footer has a scroll function
such that the complete history up until the current round is accessible. Theoretical values
were multiplied by 10 in the experiment.
– You make your choice between Door A and Door B.
– At the end of a round, you are told the number of your group members
who made each choice, what the social values were for those who chose
each door, and you are informed of your payoff in that round. Each round’s
payoff is the sum of your chosen door’s private value and your chosen
door’s social value.
Other participants face exactly the same sequence of events.
You can always see the history of the group’s choices for all rounds up to
that point at the bottom of your screen. You can also always see the sum of
the number of points that you earned so far at the top left corner of your
screen.
On the next screen you will be requested to answer some control questions.
Please answer these questions now.
6.4 Instructions for Communication
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. Please read the following
instructions carefully. When everyone has finished reading the instructions and
before the experiment starts, you will receive a handout with a summary of
‘Everybody’s Doing It’: On the Persistence of Bad Social Norms 33
the instructions. At the start of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned
to a group of 6 participants. Throughout the experiment you will stay in the
same group. You will play a number of rounds (at least 30, but not more
than 80) in which you will make decisions. In the experiment, you will receive
a starting capital of 1500 points. In addition, you earn and sometimes lose
points with your decisions in the rounds. These amounts will be added to (or
subtracted from) your starting capital. At the end of the experiment, your
final point earnings will be exchanged for euros. Five points will be exchanged
for 1 eurocent. Therefore 500 points will earn one euro.
Each round, every participant in the group will make a decision between
“Door A” and “Door B”. The payoff you receive from choosing a particular
door in a round will be the sum of two parts, based on:
– Your private value for the door (which could be positive, zero or nega-
tive), and
– Your social value for the door (which could also be positive, zero or
negative).
Private value
At the start of each round, you will be informed of your own private value for
each door. Private values are generated as follows: At the start of a round,
we will draw common values for each door, which no subject can see and
which may change in each new round. The common value for a door will be
the same for every participant in your group. However, the two doors will
most often have different common values. For each door, we will then draw
individual shocks for each participant, which again no subject can see. For
each door, every participant’s private shock is randomly drawn from a normal
distribution (with an average value of 0 and a standard deviation of 10). The
graph below clarifies how frequently different private shocks occur.
Each participant receives an independent private shock for each door.
Therefore, the private shocks for one participant usually differ from the pri-
vate shocks of the other participants. We then add the common value for each
door to your private shock for that door, which gives you your private value.
Therefore, for each door, your private value could be higher or lower than the
average private value of your group. No other participant can see your private
values.
Social value
Your social value in a round depends on how many other people in your group
make the same door choice as you. You gain if the majority of the other
participants make the same choice as you, but you make a loss if the majority
makes the other choice. Specifically, you gain 8 points for every person who
makes the same choice as you, but you lose 8 points for every person who
makes the opposite choice to you. As there are five other people in your
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group, you can get a maximum social value of 40 points if everyone chooses
the same door as you, or you can maximally lose 40 points if everyone chooses
the other door to you.
The other participants in your group face the same decision as you do.
That is, they receive similar information as you do (although their private
values will most likely differ), they also choose between Door A and Door B
and they make money in the same way as you do.
Example
In this game, there are 5 other participants in your group. So, for example, if
you choose Door A with a private value of 60 points and 4 others also choose
Door A, your payoff equals your private value (60) plus a social value (32
- 8 = 24), for a total of 84 points.
If on the other hand you choose Door B with a private value of 50 points
and the 5 others choose Door A, your payoff equals your private value (50)
minus a social value of 40 points, for a total of 10 points.
Bulletin Board
In every round, before you choose your door, you can indicate your inten-
tions. On the Bulletin Board, which everyone can see, you can choose to post
that you intend to choose Door A or Door B. Posts are anonymous and there
is no obligation to honour your posts. Alternatively, you can also elect not to
post anything. After everyone has made their decision about posting for that
round, you will be able to see the total number of posts for Door A and Door
B on the Bulletin Board before finally choosing your door.
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Sequence of events
Summing up, each round is characterised by this sequence of events:
– At the start of each round, you are told your private values for the doors.
– You can choose either to anonymously post on the Bulletin Board, or not
to post at all.
– You see the number of posts for each door on the Bulletin Board.
– You make your choice between Door A and Door B.
– At the end of a round, you are told the number of your group members
who made each choice, what the social values were for those who chose
each door, and you are informed of your payoff in that round. Each round’s
payoff is the sum of your chosen door’s private value and your chosen
door’s social value.
Other participants face exactly the same sequence of events.
You can always see the history of the group’s choices for all rounds up to
that point at the bottom of your screen. You can also always see the sum of
the number of points that you earned so far at the top left corner of your
screen.
On the next screen you will be requested to answer some control questions.
Please answer these questions now.
6.5 Instructions for Full Information
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. Please read the following
instructions carefully. When everyone has finished reading the instructions and
before the experiment starts, you will receive a handout with a summary of
the instructions. At the start of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned
to a group of 6 participants. Throughout the experiment you will stay in the
same group. You will play a number of rounds (at least 30, but not more
than 80) in which you will make decisions. In the experiment, you will receive
a starting capital of 1500 points. In addition, you earn and sometimes lose
points with your decisions in the rounds. These amounts will be added to (or
subtracted from) your starting capital. At the end of the experiment, your
final point earnings will be exchanged for euros. Five points will be exchanged
for 1 eurocent. Therefore 500 points will earn one euro.
Each round, every participant in the group will make a decision between
“Door A” and “Door B”. The payoff you receive from choosing a particular
door in a round will be the sum of two parts, based on:
– The common value of the door (which is the same for all participants),
– Your private value for the door (which could be positive, zero or nega-
tive), and
– Your social value for the door (which could also be positive, zero or
negative).
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Common value
At the start of a round, you will be told the common value for each door, which
everyone can see, and which may change in each new round. The common value
for a door will be the same for every participant in your group. However, the
two doors will most often have different common values.
Private value
At the start of each round, you will be told your private value for each door,
which will be the same for every round and which no other participant can
see. For each door, every participant’s private value is randomly drawn from a
normal distribution (with an average value of 0 and a standard deviation of 10).
The graph below clarifies how frequently different private values occur. Each
participant receives an independent private value for each door. Therefore, the
private values for one participant usually differ from the private values of the
other participants. Your private values are the same for every round in the
experiment.
Social value
Your social value in a round depends on how many other people in your group
make the same door choice as you. You gain if the majority of the other
participants make the same choice as you, but you make a loss if the majority
makes the other choice. Specifically, you gain 8 points for every person who
makes the same choice as you, but you lose 8 points for every person who
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makes the opposite choice to you. As there are five other people in your
group, you can get a maximum social value of 40 points if everyone chooses
the same door as you, or you can maximally lose 40 points if everyone chooses
the other door to you.
The other participants in your group face the same decision as you do.
That is, they receive similar information as you do (although their private
values will most likely differ), they also choose between Door A and Door B
and they make money in the same way as you do.
Example
In this game, there are 5 other participants in your group. So, for example,
if you choose Door A with a common value of 80 points, a private value of
-10 points and 4 others also choose Door A, your payoff equals the common
value plus your private value (80 + 10 = 70) plus a social value (32 - 8 =
24), for a total of 94 points.
If on the other hand you choose Door B with a common value of 40 points
and a private value of 20 points, and 5 others also choose Door B, your payoff
equals the common value plus your private value (40 + 20 = 60) plus a
social value of 40 points, for a total of 100 points.
Sequence of events
Summing up, each round is characterised by this sequence of events:
– At the start of each round, you are told your constant private values for
the doors.
– At the start of each round, you are told the new common values for the
doors.
– You make your choice between Door A and Door B.
– At the end of a round, you are told the number of your group members who
made each choice, what the social values were for those who chose each
door, and you are informed of your payoff in that round. Each round’s
payoff is the sum of your chosen door’s common value, your private
value and your chosen door’s social value.
Other participants face exactly the same sequence of events.
You can always see the history of the group’s choices for all rounds up to
that point at the bottom of your screen. You can also always see the sum of
the number of points that you earned so far at the top left corner of your
screen.
On the next screen you will be requested to answer some control questions.
Please answer these questions now.
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7 Material for online appendix
The main purpose of extending the analysis to a dynamic setting is to generate
testable hypotheses and motivate the parameters of the experiment. We are
interested in situations in which the common values are constant for some
time, such that we can investigate stable (or ‘equilibrium’) group behavior.
We assume that the expectations-formation process is homogeneous in the
sense that for a given round t, players form their expectations about the rest of
the group’s behavior, meit, via a common function ψ.
18 This function depends
on the only two pieces of information available to individuals: the difference
in their private values, and the common historical ‘norm’. We assume that i’s
expectation about the average group choice meit is decreasing in her private
value difference dit, because while individuals do not know the common values,
they are aware that the other members’ private values are positively correlated
with their own private values. We further assume that i’s expectation positively
depends on the common norm. Past history has been shown to play a role in
equilibrium selection in similar coordination games in the lab, which motivates
and supports this dependence (Romero 2015; see also Cason et al 2012, Huck
et al 2011, Cooper and Kagel 2003).
When |dit| exceeds 2J , individual i’s private value difference is so high that
she no longer considers social interactions at all, and so restrictions on expec-
tations for our purposes need only address ψ for the range dit ⊂ [−2J, 2J ].
Given the foundations above, a plausible and parsimonious function for the
formation of individuals’ expectations in round t is:
ψ(dit,mt−1) = δmt−1 − (1− δ)dit
2J
, δ ∈ [0, 1] (12)
Here, mt−1, the group choice of the previous period, represents a simplified
form of a common norm. The second term, −dit2J , describes a negative linear
relationship between i’s expectations of the proportion of the group choosing
ω = −1 and her private value difference dit in the range dit ⊂ [−2J, 2J ].
Finally, δ represents how an individual weighs the new information stem-
ming from her private values against this group norm. Section 2.4 uses an
equal weighting (δ = 0.5) as illustration; here, we generalize the analysis. This
weighting parameter will play an important role in predicting which equilib-
rium evolves. In contrast to Brock and Durlauf’s (2001) setup, individuals will
have different expectations about the behavior of others, depending on the
realisation of their own private values.
Consider a period of rounds in which the difference in the common values,
dt, is constant. ψ(dit,mt−1) can be thought of as a belief-updating process that
guides individuals’ choices towards a stable, long-run ‘equilibrium proportion’
18 Time subscripts are now introduced into the notation in order to describe the dynamic
environment.
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choosing ωit = −1. When |dt| is very small (relative to J), the system moves
faster towards equilibrium for high δ because individuals are congregated by
the existing norm, although the equilibrium may not be the socially optimal
choice. The current norm helps individuals overcome their coordination diffi-
culties, but in doing so can entice the group to forego potential social welfare.
When |dt| is very large, the system can stabilize quickly even for low δ, as
normative effects are not needed for coordination on the superior choice.
The expectation formation process (12) enables a researcher who knows the
common values and the distribution of the private shocks (though not their
realizations) to predict both the average group choice mt in a given round and,
if the common values remain constant, the dynamically-stable equilibria over
the period.
If individuals form expectations of group behavior according to (12) and
the difference in common values is constant over time, dt = d, then a stable
equilibrium expected average group choice at the end of the period solves:
m∗ = 2F
(
2Jδ
2− δm
∗ − d
)
− 1 (13)
The proof is trivially similar to that of (4) in the stage game. Recall that
an individual i does not know the common values and thus the distribution
of private values from which those of the other group members are drawn.
Substituting (12) into the threshold decision rule, i chooses ωit = −1 if dit >
2J
(
δmt−1 − (1− δ)dit2J
)
, which can be rewritten as:
dit >
2Jδ
2− δmt−1
Note that δ2−δmt−1 corresponds directly to c
∗, the equilibrium threshold.
Following similar sum-of-series calculations to (7) leads to an equilibrium av-
erage group choice prediction in a given round t of the form of (13), but
with time subscripts. Then in a period in which dt = dt+1 = d we replace
mt−1 = mt = m∗ in expectation for the stability of an equilibrium, which
leads immediately to (13).
We now turn to the question of when a bad norm can persist in a dynamic
setting. First, we rewrite (13) in terms of the equilibrium proportion of the
group choosing ωi = −1 at the end of the period:
ρ∗ = F
(
d− 2Jδ(1− 2ρ
∗)
2− δ
)
(14)
The same graphical argument of the stage game dictates that for strictly
unimodal distributions, there can again be at least one and at most three
solutions to (13). Let the private shocks once more be normally distributed
according to (ωit) ∼ N (0, 1). Then the difference in private shocks has a
cumulative distribution function following Pr (it(−1)− it(1) < x) = Φ
(
x√
2
)
,
and (14) becomes:
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Fig. 11 Minimum theoretical J required for bad and good norm coexistence.
Notes: Values are numerically calculated from (15) with d-intervals of 0.001. Individuals are
assumed to follow a homogeneous threshold rule based on weighing their private values and
group norm expectations in the form of (12) with different weighting parameters δ. Private
shocks for each choice and individual are distributed ∼ N (0, 1).
ρ∗ =Φ
(
d√
2
− 2Jδ(1− 2ρ
∗)√
2(2− δ)
)
(15)
We say that a bad norm persists when ρ∗ ≈ 0 is a possible equilibrium
during a sufficiently long period of time in which choice ωi = −1 is gener-
ally preferable from a group welfare perspective. As long as the difference in
common payoffs, d, is large enough relative to the social factor, J , the only
sustainable long-run equilibrium in the system is the ‘good’ norm ρ∗ ≈ 1.
However, when d is small relative to J so that social value is relatively more
important than individualistic returns, two stable equilibria emerge: p∗ ≈ 0
and p∗ ≈ 1. By way of an explicit example, for d-values from 0 to 4, the min-
imum value of J for which both a bad norm of ρ∗ ≈ 0 and a good norm of
ρ∗ ≈ 1 can persist is shown in Figure 11.
Continuing the example, consider the parameter space d = 2, J = 8,
and the normal shock distribution described above. Figure 11 shows that for
δ = 0.5, a bad norm ρ∗ ≈ 0 can persist. To investigate the likelihood of this
occurring, this system was simulated for a group of 100 individuals with self-
fulfilling expectations mei following the form of (12) and δ = 0.5. The initial
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Fig. 12 Simulated equilibria for fixed common value difference d = 2 and other parameters
J = 4, N = 100, δ = 0.5.
Notes: ρt gives the proportion of individuals choosing ωi = −1 in a round t. Starting
proportions are taken from ∼ U(0, 1) across 100,000 simulations of 50 rounds. Individuals
are assumed to have expectations of the form specified in (12) with δ = 0.5.
proportion ρ0 choosing ωi = −1 was uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and,
for each starting value, the game was played for 50 rounds. From 100,000
simulations the bad norm persisted approximately 20% of the time, requiring
less than a quarter of the population initially choosing ωi = −1. Figure 12
shows the result of these simulations. When J is reduced below the persistence
threshold to 4, the system stabilizes at ρ∗ ≈ 1 in every simulation; the group
always switches to the good norm after 50 rounds. If dt is allowed to vary
slightly around a mean of 2, the results generally hold. Bad norms are now
less likely to exist for J = 8, but this reduction comes solely from initial values
around ρ0 = 0.25; the results are unchanged for initial proportions close to 0.
The results of these simulations motivate the choice of the social factors
we use to test the model in the lab. To further draw closer the theory and
experiment, we now tailor the analysis to the specific parameterizations of the
experiment. This has the interesting feature that we can compare, according to
the theory, under which circumstances our groups of subjects in the experiment
should shift their equilibrium choice. We simulate the specific treatments in
our 2× 2 design for the parameter combinations J = {4, 8}, N = {6, 11}. We
use the same sequence of common values across 50 rounds that our participants
face, in which dt ≈ 2 for rounds 25-50 after a norm of mt ≈ 1 has been induced.
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Individuals in the simulations form expectations using (12), and we allow δ to
vary in order to investigate when treatment groups can ‘break’ the bad norm
by coordinating on the good equilibria m∗ = −1.
Figure 13 displays the results. Clear social factor effects can be seen; for
the weaker J = 4, a much larger weighting on the existing norm is required
for the bad norm ρ = 0 to persist as the equilibrium. In addition, group size
plays almost no role in the simulated equilibria, although slight differences can
be detected at the critical δ levels where equilibria switch. These differences
are consistent with the theoretical predictions about group size discussed in
the main Appendix. Specifically, the model predicts that for small N , smaller
groups are slightly more likely to switch away from a bad norm in the short
run, and would be expected to do so faster. Between groups of very large sizes,
however, the effect of N on bad norm persistence becomes negligible.
Fig. 13 Equilibrium selection from simulations
Notes: Results are reported for δ-values ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.001, with each
being simulated 1,000 times per treatment. Each simulation used the common values shown
in Figure 1.
Pluralistic Ignorance
The experimental test of the pluralistic ignorance perspective of bad norm
persistence uses a treatment in which individuals know the common values
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as well as the distribution of private shocks. The full information may affect
individuals’ expectations about group behavior, as has been demonstrated in
many other experimental games. In this context, individuals form their ex-
pectations on the basis of the common values, rather than their own private
values, and moreover, the certainty provided by information about common
utility logically prompts more weighting on this component of expectations
formation function. We now propose to reconcile these results with the pre-
ceding theoretical analysis. Let δ′ represent the weighting parameter for an
individual, who otherwise forms expectations with δ, in the presence of full
information. Then ψ(dit,mt) = δ
′mt−1 − (1 − δ′) d2J , δ′ ∈ [0, 1], where it is
assumed that δ′ < δ. It follows that the equilibrium condition for a stable
average group choice becomes:
m∗ = 2F (2Jδ′m∗ − (2− δ′)d)− 1 (16)
The effect of full information on bad norm persistence is not trivial when
contrasted with respect to the previous analysis. The substitution of the com-
mon values for an individual’s private values in the expectations formation
function increases the scope for the ‘bad’ equilibrium to emerge, while the
lower weighting parameter has the opposite effect. However, in terms of sensi-
tivity, persistence is extremely responsive to changes in δ; a very small decrease
in an individual’s weighting of the existing group norm causes a large reduc-
tion in the scope of bad norm persistence for a given {d, J} parameter space.
Given this, we may expect that the absence of uncertainty over the common
values significantly decreases the reliance on historical norms for an individ-
ual’s expectation about future group behavior. In the extreme case in which
δ′ = 0, the equilibrium condition reduces to m∗ = 1 − 2F (2d), which gives
only one ‘good’ equilibrium for given common values and no longer depends
on the social factor at all.
Communication
The results of the communication treatment can be reconciled in a similar
manner. Past experiments have found a positive effect of communication on
equilibrium selection. Choi and Lee (2014) find that coordination is enhanced
by allowing communication in networks. However, in their experiment the roles
of implicit agreement and punishment from deviations are necessary for im-
proving coordination. Ochs (2008) shows that the effect of communication can
differ in different coordination games; interestingly, this paper also highlights
the role of past precedent, a mechanism that in our experiment corresponds
to the strength of the bad norm. In our experiment, we are particularly inter-
ested in anonymous signalling that one might expect from posting on internet
bulletin boards or social media. While this cheap talk is non-binding, it again
can be thought of as shifting the focus away from historical precedent and
towards illuminating present group preferences. Such a shift lowers δ, which
we predict should decrease the probability of bad norm persistence.
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Estimating δ
One of the predictions of the theoretical analysis is that individuals place
less weight on the group norm when forming expectations in environments of
greater certainty of others’ preferences. That is, the coordination benefits of
having more information or being allowed to communicate manifest themselves
in a lower weighting parameter δ. We now compare estimates of δ in the Com-
munication and Full Information treatments to those of the baseline design in
SmallStrong. As opposed to the model’s simulations, we now allow individuals
in a group to have heterogeneous values for δi ∈ [0, 1]. We estimate the range of
an individual’s true δi-value from her choice behavior in the experiment under
the assumption that subjects followed the threshold decision rule of Propo-
sition 1 and the simple belief-updating rule of (12) in a consistent manner.
An individual using this belief-updating process chooses ωit = −1 (Door B in
our experiment) in round t if and only if dit >
2Jδi
(2−δi)mt−1. Then, depending
on the private values and group norm in a particular round, the choices of an
individual who behaves consistently narrow the ranges of our estimate of her
true value. We use the midpoints of each individual’s estimated bounds for
δi after 50 rounds in order to compare the weighting parameters of the Full
Information and Communication treatments to those of the corresponding
baseline treatment SmallStrong (Figure 14).
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the addition of communication
or full information to the setup significantly lowers the weight that individ-
uals place on the group norm in forming their expectations. For N = 6 and
J = 8, the estimated δ-values are noticeably lower in the Full Information
and Communication treatments than in the baseline treatment SmallStrong.
These differences are highly significant (p = .00 for both two-way t-test com-
parisons).19 The results are interesting in the context of our theoretical analysis
in that they support the prediction of a lower weighting of the group norm
where there is reduced uncertainty about others’ choices.
19 There are no significant differences in estimated δ-values between Communication and
Full Information, nor among the baseline treatments.
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Fig. 14 Cumulative distribution plots for estimates of δi by treatment
Notes: CDFs are of the midpoint of the estimated range of the weighting parameter δ for
each subject, given her choices in the experiment and assuming a belief-updating process
described in (12). For each of the three treatments, N = 6 and J = 8. The results suggest
that subjects in the Full Information and Communication treatments of the experiment
placed less weight on the group norm in forming their expectations about others’ choices.
